The Army Has Ceased to Fear

The army in India was divided into three separate entities – Bengal, Bombay and Madras. They differed in all aspects, from organization to their very size. Although in 1857 the Bombay Army did show some disaffection, there was none in Madras and the uprising in Bombay was brief and quickly quelled.

Organisation of the Bengal Army

The Commander-in-Chief of the Bengal Army and Commander-in-Chief of India in 1857 was General Anson who was in Simla at the time of the outbreak. He had seen active service during his career as an Ensign in the 3rd (Scots Fusiliers) Guards in Napoleonic Wars and had fought at the Battle of Waterloo.
The army which General Anson was in charge of was divided into seven divisions spread out over a vast area through the entire Bengal Presidency up to the Khyber Pass.

  1. Presidency Division, Calcutta. Commanded by Major General Sir John Bennet Hearsay
  2. Dinapore Division. Commanded by Major General Sir G.W.A. Lloyd
  3. Cawnpore Division. Commanded by Major General Sir Hugh Wheeler
  4. Meerut Division. Commanded by Major General S.H. Hewitt
  5. Sirhind Division. Commanded by Major General Sir Henry Barnard
  6. Lahore Division. Commanded by Major General G.E. Gowan
  7. Peshawar Divison. Commanded by Major General T. Reed.

Regular Native Troops in the Bengal Army

10 regiments of Bengal Light Cavalry
74 regiments of Bengal Native Infantry
18 companies of Bengal Foot Artillery, with 8 field batteries attached
12 companies of Bengal Sappers and Miners
18 regiments of Irregular Cavalry

The mEn who served john’s company in bengal

In 1857, the Bengal Army consisted of 151,361 men of all ranks – 128,663 were Indians, the bulk of which were sepoys, serving in 74 infantry regiments and 10 of cavalry. The majority of the irregular cavalry was made up of Muslims, the light cavalry and the infantry regiments were traditionally Hindus – the light cavalry regiments were almost exclusively of a high caste – – by 1857 the infantry regiments were composed of “Mahommedans, Brahmins—Rajputs, Gwallahs, Kaits, Aheers, Jats and some low caste men.” They came from Oudh, North and South Bihar, the Doab of the Ganges and the Jamuna, Rohilkhand, some for Bundelkhand and a few from the Punjab. Two-fifths of the Bengal Artillery were Muslims, while the remaining 57 percent were Hindus of different castes.
The incentive to join the army was often a result of tradition, with the son following his father into the same regiment, or in the case of Sitaram in 1812, he was recruited by his uncle. Although recruiting parties would be sent out to find willing young men to join up, the preferred method was to let relatives bring in the boys themselves and thus guarantee by way of family ties, not only their loyalty but their respectability.
It had been the policy of the HEICo (Honorable East India Company) initially to recruit mainly high caste Hindus – Rajputs who were the traditional warrior caste in Northern India, Bhumimars (the military arm of the priest caste), and even Brahmins themselves, the idea being that besides being physically fitter than men from the labourer classes, the Company felt they would not only prove to be the most loyal but somehow give the new rulers of India a stamp of legitimacy. If your army consists of the best men society has to offer then how can the HEICo in its turn be wrong? This was not perhaps the soundest judgment but for some time, as the army grew and gained accolades in various campaigns it appeared to at least be a functioning theory.
The first Governor-General of India, Lord William Bentinck saw a danger in this kind of recruitment as it put an emphasis on religion and creed over duty and could potentially be a future threat to discipline. His worries were not unfounded and by the 1840s, the army was actively recruiting from a broader segment of the population. It is interesting to note, however, that although caste always played an important part in all of the armies, be it Bengal, Bombay, or Madras, it was only in Bengal and briefly in Bombay that it actually became an issue. This however had more to do with the organization of the army of Bengal itself or, the lack of it.

ORGANISATION OF A BENGAL REGIMENT

An infantry regiment of the Bengal Establishment was, in 1857 composed of 1000 privates, 120 non-commissioned officers, and 20 Indian commissioned officers.
It was further divided into ten companies; each company contained 100 privates, 2 Indian commissioned officers, and 12 Indian non-commissioned officers.
Regiments did not live in barracks but in lines – so-called as the thatched houses in which the men lived were organized in 10 rows, one behind the other. Each company had its own lines. At every new station, the sepoys and non-commissioned officers had to either buy or build their own huts- these were generally 10 feet long, 8 feet wide and 7 feet high, made of mud and roofed by thatch, that leaking the in monsoons and often situated on land that lacked adequate drainage. Commissioned officers had three huts in a small compound that was encircled by a low mud wall.
In front of each row was located a small round building where the weapons and accessories were stored when the men were off duty. The key was kept by the duty sergeant, or to give him his Indian name, the havildar.

Rising in the ranks was virtually impossible under the system in place in 1857 as it was strictly based on seniority. A man could join as a boy of 16 and find he has only attained the rank of naik (corporal) by the age of 36. The average age of havildar (sergeant) was 45, a jemadar (lieutenant) at 54, and a subadar (captain) at the ripe old age of 60. The system was brutally unfair and the commanding officer of a regiment had no power to pass over any man for promotion without the approval of the Commander-in-Chief.

Indian InfantryIndian CavalryBritish Infantry Rank
SepoySowarPrivate
Lance NaikActing Lance DuffadarLance Corporal
NaikLance DuffadarCorporal
HavildarDuffadarSergeant
Havildar MajorKot DuffadarSergeant Major
JemadarJemadarLieutenant
SubedarRisaldarCaptain
Subedar MajorRisaldar MajorMajor
Comparative Ranks

Needless to say, all Indian personnel were subordinate to even the most junior of European officers. The highest rank an Indian soldier could obtain was Subedar-Major which in the East India Company army (HEICo) was in all actuality no more than a senior subaltern rank. Indian officers did not command nor were they taught to – although some did prove themselves to be capable commanders during the mutiny, they had not been actively encouraged to take on leadership roles.

DUTIES AND THE LACK THEREOF

Peacetime duty was neither strenuous nor engaging. A sepoy was required to attend the morning parade for the cleaning of his weapon and accouterments, and then while away the time until evening parade for orders and guard duties. The monotony of this relentless routine was broken up by a brigade exercise once a week and regimental exercises four times a week. They were also increasingly used as an impromptu police force, detailed to escort treasure and guard prisoners.
As the chances of war decreased so did the sepoys chance of bettering his finances. Pay was notoriously poor and in 1857 it was the same as it had been at the turn of the century, a paltry 7 rupees or 14 shillings a month. The cost of living however had nearly doubled in the same time and the introduction of long service pay helped matters only slightly as it was dependent solely on good conduct. It increased their pay by 1 rupee after 16 years of service and 2 after 20. Rank was not taken into consideration nor was outstanding duty. In 1837, a new pension scheme came into effect which entitled a sepoy to 4 rupees a month after 15 years and 7 rupees for those who had served for 40 years. Disabled sepoys were entitled to the same amount and their families received the pensions if a sepoy was killed in action. Where rank was concerned, a subedar or subedar major would retire on 25 rupees after 15 years and 40 after 40 years. But to qualify for a pension in the first place a man had to be declared unfit for duty by a board of surgeons. This rarely happened and as long as sepoy could walk, he was expected to serve.
Sepoys were furthermore expected to feed and clothe themselves from their meager salaries, although after the reforms of 1828, they were provided with a jacket and a pair of trousers once every 2 years and the amount they had to pay for the other items of uniform was set so as to not cost more than 5 rupees a year which was unrealistic at best. Regardless of what the intent was, many sepoys inevitably fell into debt and subsisted on a hand-to-mouth existence. In the cavalry regiments including the irregular ones, although better paid, they were expected to buy their own horse and all the trappings thus setting them further into debt than their infantry counterparts. The system was crying out for reform but it would not be until 1895 that the sepoys saw any rise in their pay.
A successful campaign brought with it the reward of plunder which the HEICo stamped with the moniker “prize money,” thus legitimizing the long-standing practice of looting and pillaging. It was one way a soldier, – sepoy and European alike – had to line their coffers but by 1850 most of India had been conquered and minor campaigns against troublesome tribes did not bring big rewards.

AS FOR THE EUROPEANS

35th Bengal Native Infantry, Officer’s Shoulder Belt Plate, 1843- 1855, sold by Bonhams in 2020.

The European officers were organized the same as those in an English regiment and their duties did not differ as such, nor the structure.
The Commander, usually of the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel at the head of the regiment, the Adjutant superintended drill and would make daily reports to the commanding officer, the Quarter-Master attend to the men’s uniforms and he was often also the Interpreter whose sole job was to translate all orders given.
Each company had its own officer – and it was up to him to keep his men content, listen to their grievances, and anything he could not settle himself, he was duty-bound to report it to his commanding officer.

In peacetime, an officer’s day could hardly be said to be busy – after morning parade they were generally left to shift for themselves, occupying their time with reading, writing, sleeping, and socializing when possible, and with the exception of occasional guard duty or perhaps the odd parade or two, a regimental officer effectively had nothing to do. Whereas previously, men in these positions had shown interest in their men and had even spoken their language in the decades preceding 1857, this new breed of officer was neither well-bred nor well-read for that matter – they had joined the service simply for the security it offered and for the prospect of improving one’s social standing. Their training at the military college of Addiscombe was poor – consisting mostly of mathematics, a touch of science, a brief sojourn in a subject such as fortification was based on the teachings of a 17th-century engineer who had never set foot in India, military drawing was theoretical at best and language skills were at worst the most basic. These young men came to India with the sole purpose of bettering themselves; they had little or no interest in sepoys or for that matter, soldiering. As the century rolled towards 1857, respectlessness for Indian soldiers by junior European officers who by rules were ranked higher than the oldest serving sepoy had become the norm rather than the exception.

In regular cavalry regiments, there would be a colonel – a position that was rarely more than honorary. Below him were two lieutenant-colonels. Below them, the Regiment was divided into two “Wings”. Each wing had a major, 6- or 7 captains, and as many as a dozen lieutenants. The lowest rank was that of cornet. A lieutenant would be chosen as an Adjutant and additionally as usually an interpreter and Quarter-Master. In addition, the regiment would have attached to it one or two surgeons, a veterinary surgeon and a riding master, who was also the warrant officer.

Ideally, twenty-six European officers made up the full complement of an Indian infantry regiment but it was very rare that all of them were present at any given time. Usually, no more than 15 and sometimes no more than 7 were actually there. Life for an officer in the army of the Honorable East India Company could be stultifying to any young man who possessed talent. Lucrative positions or detached service in Irregular Corps and in the civil service provided not just better pay but generous prospects for advancement and certainly a more exciting existence than regular army service. By 1857 it was more common to view the army as a stepping stone to a better career – 1000 British officers (startling the majority of these were field officers – majors and above, and captains) were pursuing such a course and those that remained with their regiments were not always the best and brightest. Often only in India because of connections in England who had secured them their positions, they were too readily disinterested in their men, unambitious to the point of apathy and they despised India. The junior officers more often than not outright hated the sepoys, and married officers simply retreated into domestic life. They would have been better off paying heed to the words of Captain Albert Hervey of the Madras Army:

“Treat the sepoys well; attend to their wants and complaints, be patient and, at the same time, determined with them; never lose sight of your rank as an officer, be the same with them in every situation; show you have confidence in them; lead them well and prove to them that you look upon them as brave men and faithful soldiers, and they will die for you. But adopt a different line of conduct – abuse them; ill-treat them; neglect them; place no confidence in them; show indifference to their wants or comforts – and they are very devils!”

Unfortunately, for the Bengal Army, they hardly had anyone who thought like Captain Hervey.

What they did have in 1857 were officers who lived separate from their men, in bungalows – near the lines but still too far to have any meaningful contact with the men they were supposed to command. During the heat of the day, the Europeans would be sweltering in their shuttered bungalows, and for 8 months of the year, they would barely stir out of doors, except for their morning and evening rides. Supervision on the lines was given over to two sergeants as permitted to serve each corps, who were the only Europeans who actually lived among the men in the Lines. They were responsible to present a daily report to the Adjutant as to what the men were actually up to.
Not that it had always been this way.

The Army Reforms

Blessing of the colours of the 35th Bengal Light Infantry, 1847

Sitaram, who had been recruited into the Bengal Army in 1812 and served until 1857 remembered.

“When I was a sepoy, the Captain of my company would have some of the men at his house all day long and he talked with them…” The officers took an active part in their lives, arranging amusements for their men such as nautches (erotically charged dance exhibitions), taking them hunting, competing with them in sports – and when not actively participating, were always present at their games, and treated them with as high a regard as if they had been equals. The army was led by men who genuinely loved India and had no intention of leaving it. Their Indian wives and mistresses helped the officers bridge the gap – these were men who understood the language and above all, their men.

At the time when Sitaram was recruited, and indeed for the first 30 years of the 19th century, commanding officers wielded actual power over men. They could promote and demote, punish without recourse to a court-martial, they could dismiss unruly men, impose corporal punishment (flogging with cane) in cases of severe breaches to discipline, refuse leave and even implement extra drill and duties. Although this may all sound fearsome, the men knew who their leader was, for better or for worse – as Sitaram wrote, “we liked the sahib who always treated us if we were his children.” But these were officers of a completely different breed – a breed that was rapidly dying out, not just through old age but through the reforms being forced upon the army. Unfortunately, the sepoy himself was not averse to taking advantage of their powerless commanders and from being petted children, they were rapidly becoming undisciplined, spoiled ones.

By 1835, Lord William Bentinck did away with corporal punishment throughout the native army. He believed it belittled a man and where a good man might be induced to join up, he would inevitably refuse due to the fear of the whip. Although the abolition was short-lived and reintroduced by Governor-General Lord Harding in 1845, it barely served as a deterrent to anything at all. Officers were advised to

“inflict corporal punishment as seldom as possible, commuting it for other punishment in all cases where it can be done with safety to the discipline of the army.”

In other words, punish but be gentle about it. Flogging could only be used in cases of mutiny, insubordination, and drunkenness on duty – however for other offenses, such as stealing and unruliness, it was no longer tolerated. In fact, flogging was so sparingly used in Bengal that and an Indian officer remarked to his colonel that, “As long as the lash was hanging over the bad man’s head, he was all right but now they do not care for the commanding officer or anyone else.”

With flogging no longer in his power, the commanding officer could resort to a court-martial but the sepoys had found a way to go around even this form of punishment. A court-martial, under the new reform, had to be sanctioned by the Commander-in-Chief and was no longer solely in the power of the commanding officer. Then if the sepoys were dissatisfied with the resulting punishment, which they inevitably were, they would simply petition the commander-in-chief to overturn their sentence. Although protocol dictated that the sepoy could only send such a petition through his commanding officer, they sent it directly without him ever being privy to it. More often than not, the appeals were upheld and the sentences revoked. Even men who had been deemed unfit for service could thus be reinstated to their regiment and the commanding officer was powerless to do anything.
To add insult to injury, the government also felt that the old men who commanded the army were, for lack of a better term, judgmentally deficient. Although this was very much the case in some instances, it was not necessarily true of everyone. Meerut is an example of a station run by men who should long have been pensioned off and William Hodson remembered a man who “was not able to mount a horse without the assistance of two men. A brigadier of the infantry… could not see his regiment when I led his horse by the bridle until its nose touched their bayonets and even then he said faintly,” Pray, which way are the men facing, Mr. Hodson?” This brigadier, it will be noted, served during the Mutiny.
The problem was the practice of promotion by seniority. The system left younger men who would have been excellent senior officers, simply chomping at the bit, waiting for their turn but by the time it came, they were often too old to be of any use. The system was prevalent among Indian officers as well – but there had been a time when a commanding officer had had the power to promote a man on merit. The government now put an end to that – instead of abolishing the seniority clause altogether, it simply prevented the commanding officer from having any meaningful use to his men. In their eyes, he had lost his prestige. While this system could be irksome to an English officer, it was positively loathsome to an Indian one – he would spend his life in practical servitude, his rank no matter how high would still be worth less than that of an English subaltern, he would have to take orders from increasingly disdainful officers who no longer cared for their regiments, and be subjected by rules imposed by a government that was not his own.

With the young men either on detached duty or disinterested in their men, and the old ones no longer held in esteem and the constant government meddling, it is no wonder that by January 1857, Lieutenant-Colonel Doughter of the 60th Bengal Native Infantry upon – returning to his regiment after a three-year absence wrote,

“I saw a great laxity in ranks, worse even than when I got command of the regiment in 1849. The authority of the commanding officer had become less than mine was as a subaltern, as regards punishment drill to non-commissioned officers, owing to army standing orders being set aside by circulars, and by station orders issued by officers perfectly ignorant of the proper method of keeping sepoys in subjection, and thereby interfering with the commanding officer’s authority, and rendering him a mere cipher in the eyes of his men.”

By 1857, a commanding officer was mostly powerless – he was unable to make promotions, he could not give immediate recognition for loyal service, and at the worst end of things, could not refuse the court-martial of any sepoy under his command -this was the result of thoughtless army reforms by men who had no idea that the army needed to be led by men who could exude absolute control over their men.

In other words, by 1857, the army had ceased to respect their commanding officers.

Until 1842 when the Britsh endured a singularly catastrophic defeat in Afghanistan, the men of the Bengal army still held the officers in some awe. They had been victorious in practically all of their ventures and plunder had been rich, but Afghanistan was a kick in the face of prestige. The army had seen their officers run and not a few had behaved horrifyingly poorly, to the point of abandoning their own men. The retreat from Afghanistan was not just a loss in terms of war – it proved this invader was actually not invincible.
Although the Sikh Wars did go some way to restore some of the army’s reputation, these too brought their own problems. The sepoys soon realized that with a defeated Sikh nation, their own existence was at stake. A conquered Punjab meant there would effectively be no war left to fight in India, leaving the sepoy with nothing to do and at the whim of a war-happy government that could now send them overseas to fight in other nations. This could be anywhere over the dreaded black water – overseas to China or Burma – a notion abhorrent to a high caste Hindu. While this was something that had been avoided until now (overseas duty was voluntary and the Bengal regiments did what they could to not have to go) but leave it to Lord Canning, to make it a reality.

ENTER LORD CANNING, GOVERNOR-GENERAL

Charles Canning, 1st Earl Canning, daguerreotype, 1845

Following in the footsteps of that overzealous Lord Dalhousie, who we remember for his infamous and abhorrent use of the Doctrine of Lapse to steal vast swathes of land for the HEICo’, came Charles Canning, whose greatest misfortune, was to be the son “of an illustrious man.” He had proven himself to be a hard worker who appears to have taken to administration quite readily. However, he was not his father. His abilities were described unkindly as “mediocre” and his personality “weak, ” a man easily swayed by the opinions of others and given over to relying on his advisors rather than judging a situation for himself. As Governor-General of a country at peace he might have struggled somewhat but faced with one in mutiny, Canning was frankly overwhelmed. Cautioned by Henry Lawrence to introduce any reform to the army as slowly as possible, Canning allowed himself to ignore sage advice and introduced the much dreaded General Service Enlistment Order to the Bengal Army within the first year of his term in India, in 1856.

It basically required that all new recruits must take an oath to serve where ever they were required to. Henry Lawrence was so appalled by the order he wrote to Canning in May 1857, ” The General Service Enlistment Order is most distasteful.. it keeps many out of service and frightens the old sepoys who imagine that the oaths of the young recruits affect the whole regiment.”

The Supreme Council of India was composed of experienced men who should have been able to advise Lord Canning in a crisis such as the Mutiny. Although they did advise him in abundance, they did not do it very well. Each had their own talents; none of them were particularly good at anything besides an inordinate amount of squabbling. I will describe this terrifying group in another chapter but suffice to say, Mr. Dorin had barely left Calcutta in 33 years of service, Mr. J.P. Grant had no knowledge of sepoys and disliked military men with a passion, General Low, though a man who had actual service under his belt was by 1857 too old and was unable to get his point across, and then, of course, have the flamboyantly named Mr. Peacock, who as the Law Member of Council had absolutely no experience with soldiers and was incapable of recognizing what a threat the mutiny actually was. His intentions might have been pure but his thinking was flawed. We are then left with Colonel Birch – Secretary to the Government of India for the Military Department, a sycophant, and a man who had spent so many years behind a desk he knew nothing of the Bengal Army, nor had he spoken to sepoy in living memory. History has been kinder to Colonel Birch than his contemporaries ever were.

The Annexation of Oudh in 1856 had not only rankled men like Henry Lawrence, it was the worst single catastrophe for the sepoys of Bengal. Not only was it achieved under false pretenses – citing misrule by the Nawab, an accusation that was never fully explained nor could be justified, but it had also been done in such a way as to humiliate the ruler. He was sent packing with a pension off to Calcutta; but the vast amount of people under his employ, including his personal army were left penniless and above all, jobless. Until annexation, Oudh had been Company’s main recruiting ground; but how could the sepoys trust a government which took over their homeland by lies? Although the question regarding the annexation deserves a lengthier answer, suffice to say, this blatant act of Company greed was deliberate. There was no misunderstanding and it was not a mistake.

Changes in Domestic Affairs

Until 1813 missionaries had been banned by the HEICo who saw them as disturbers of the peace, but in that year, the Evangelical element of the British parliament forced them, against their better judgment to repeal the ban. In their wake came a flood of mission schools, reform societies, and the usual bevy of street preachers and men who had no understanding at all of Indian culture nor an interest in preserving it. It is no wonder then that the army when faced with a commanding officer who actively preached the Gospel at them – and there were many who did – could not help wondering if the British weren’t there to convert them all to Christianity after all.

By the 1830s, keeping Indian mistresses or having an Indian wife had fallen out of societal favor and the era of the memsahib began. It is unfair to say that these women were the cause of the breakdown of relations between officers and their men, but their advent came at an already troublesome time. However, an officer with an English wife who offered him the comforts of an English home, albeit in a warmer climate, was less likely to spend his time with his men. The women themselves would have very little exposure to India itself and much less to the men their husbands commanded. There are always exceptions – Harriet Tytler, a true daughter of the regiment, Elizabeth Wagentreiber who could fall on her family legacy, but for the most part, women were often constrained by their Victorian upbringing which had been undoubtedly stunted by the conventions of the time, and India was a vastly strange world which provided them with no end of shocks. Although they would have been aware of the sepoys, they would not have been able to keep their society nor would it have been accepted if they had tried. Victorian women were kept on a pedestal supported by supposed virtues and endless prejudices – especially in Bengal, where society was far stricter than in Bombay or Madras, English women were practically the most isolated people in India. They might have added another component to the already disintegrating nature of relations in the Bengal army, but they were not the sole cause.

The bungalows were inevitably thatched – all the easier to burn down

By 1857 a general disaffection had invaded the army of Bengal. The causes had been creeping in for years and as grievances, both real and imaginary, continued to be ignored and hardly addressed and it took only the mere idea of a greased cartridge to set the fire alight. This and other causes will be addressed in the following chapter as we delve deeper into the events leading up to May 1857. For this, we will need to go back to February 1857 and the often neglected mutiny at Berhampore.

The Regiments

Nearly three-fourths of the Bengal Army was involved in the uprising. The following list can give the reader an idea of the scale of the event and how it led to the demise of some of the finest regiments the army had.

Regimental Colours of the 1st Bengal Light Infantry
Officers and men of the 41st Bengal Native Infantry, a regiment that mutinied in Sitapur

The 74 Regiments of Native Infantry

Full Regimental Title                                                  1857 and After

1st Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1757; formed at Kolkata as the “Lal Pultan”(Red Battalion) ranked as 1st Battalion.
Mutinied at Cawnpore.
In 1861 he title was awarded to the 21st Bengal Native Infantry which later became the 1st Regiment of Brahman Infantry.
2nd (Grenadiers) Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1758: raised in Burdwan as the Burdwan Battalion.
1859: disarmed at Barrackpore and disbanded.
In 1861 the title was given to the 31st Regiment of Bengal Light Infantry which later became the 2nd Queen Victoria’s Own Rajput Light Infantry
3rd Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1758: raised – name unknown but ranked as 10th Battalion
Mutinied at Phillour – loyal portion joined The Loyal Purbiah Regiment
4th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1759 raised in Midnapore – name unknown
1857 mutinied at Phillour, disarmed at Kangra and Noorpore
In 1861, the title was given to the 33rd Bengal Native Infantry which later became the 4th Bengal Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry.
5th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1758 raised in Chittagong and called the Chittagong Battalion ranked as 4th Battalion
1857 mutinied at Umballa on 23 May
6th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1763 raised as 13th Battalion
1857 mutinied at Allahabad 6 June
7th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1759 raised
1857: Mutinied at Dinapore 25 July
8th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1760 raised in Burdwan ranked 9th Battalion
1857 mutinied at Dinapore 25 July
9th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1761: raised at Bankypore by Captain Giles Stibbert ranked as 6th Battalion
Infantry
1857: mutinied at Allygurh 20 May and Mynpoorie 23 May
10th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1759: raised at Bankypore by Captain Giles Stibbert
1857: mutinied at Futtegarh 18 June.
11th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1763: raised in Calcutta by Captain Gilbert Ironside ranked 14th Battalion
1857: mutinied at Meerut 10 May
12th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1763: raised as 15th Battalion at Monghyr by Captain John White
1857: mutinied at Jhansi 5 June
13th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1764: raised as 18th Battalion at Mooshedabad by Captain Thomas Goddard
1857: mutinied at Lucknow 30 May
14th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1764: raised 20th Battalion at Midnapore by Captain Scotland
1857: mutinied at Jhelum 7 July
15th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1765: raised at Allahabad as the Hooseney Battalion by General Smith ranked as 20th Battalion
1857: mutinied at Nusseerabad 28 May
16th (Grenadiers) Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1764: raised at Mooshedabad by Captain Alexander Dow
1857:  mutinied at Meean Meer 14 May
17th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1765: raised at Bankypore by Colonel Sir Robert Barker ranked as 21st Battalion
1857: mutinied at Azimguhr 3 June
18th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1776: raised for the Vizier of Oude
1857: Mutinied at Bareilly
In 1861, the title was given to the Alipore Regiment which later became the 18th Infantry
19th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1776 raised for the Vizier of Oude under Captain Young
1857 mutinied at Berhampore on 25 February. Colonel Mitchell persuaded them to give up their arms and they were marched to Barrackpore and disbanded on 31 March.
In 1861 after the mutiny the number was given to the 7th Regiment of Punjab Infantry
20th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1776: raised for the Vizier of Oude under Captain Baillie
Mutinied at Meerut
In 1861, the title was given to the 8th Regiment of Punjab Infantry
21st Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1776: raised in Oudh by Captain T Naylor ifor service in the army of Nawab Wazir of Oudh
Did not mutiny – became 1st Bengal Native Infantry
1777: transferred to the HEICo service.
1857: only 1 of 12 regiments that did not mutiny.
1901: designated the 1st Brahman Infantry
1922:designated as the 4th Battalion 1st Punjab Regiment.
1931: disbanded
22nd Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1778: raised at Cawnpore by Captain Charles Bowles ranked as 32nd Battalion of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: mutinied at Fyzabad 8 June
23rd Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1778: raised as an independent Light Infantry corps at Ramgur by Captain James Crawford Jnr
1857: mutinied at Mhow on 1 July
In 1861 after the mutiny the title was taken by the 15th (Pioneer) Regiment of Punjab Infantry later to become the 23rd Punjab Pioneers.
24th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1779 raised at Chunar by Captain William Davis
Disarmed at Peshawar
In 1861, the title was given to the 8th Regiment of Punjab Infantry which later became the 24th Regiment of Punjab Infantry.
25th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry (Volunteers)1795: raised as the Marine Battalion
1857: disbanded
In 1861, after the mutiny, the title was given to the 17th Regiment of Punjab Infantry which later became the 25th Regiment of Punjab Infantry.
26th Regiment of Bengal Native (Light) Infantry1797: raised as 1st Btn 13th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry following 1796
1857: mutinied at Mean Meer 1 May.
Massacred at Ajnala 1 August.
27th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1797: raised as 2nd Btn 13th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: disarmed at Peshawar 22 May
28th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1797: raised as 1st Btn 14th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: mutinied at Shahjahanpur mid June
29th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1797: raised as 2nd Btn 14th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry following 1796
1857: mutinied at Moradabad in June
30th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1798: raised as 1st Btn 15th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: mutinied at Nusseerabad 28 May
31st Regiment of Bengal Native (Light) Infantry1798: Raised by the HEICoas a 2nd Battalion for the 15th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1828: separated from the 15th i to form the 31st Bengal Native Infantry
1857:Did not mutiny and fought in the Central India Campaign
1861: it became the 2nd Bengal Native Light Infantry
1876: became the 2nd (Queen’s Own) Regiment of Bengal Native Light Infantry.( after 1922, also called the 2nd Rajputs)
After India’s Independence in 1947, the battalion was elevated to “Guard” status and transferred to the Brigade of the Guards as its 4th Battalion.
32nd Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1798: raised as the the 1st Battalion, 16th Bengal Native Infantry
1857: Mutinied at Deogurh; though not the whole regiment.
1861: The loyal portion became the the 3rd Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry 1901: when the the army stopped using the presdencies in their names, they were designated the the 3rd Brahmans. Before being disbanded in 1922
1922: disbanded
33rd Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1798: raised as the 2nd Battalion, 16th Bengal Native Infantry.
1857: Disarmed at Phillour, the loyal portion served however, in the Mutiny.
1861: designated the 4th Bengal Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1890: designated the 4th (Prince Albert Victor’s) Bengal Infantry
1918:  the 4th Prince Albert Victor’s Rajputs became the 2nd Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment.
After India’s independence, one of the regiments allocated to the Indian Army.
34th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1798: raised as 1st Btn 17th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: mutinied at Barrackpore on 29 March
35th Regiment of Bengal Native (Light) Infantry1798: raised as 2nd Btn 17th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: disarmed at Phillour during the Mutiny
36th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry (Bengal Volunteers)1799: raised as 1st Btn 18th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: Mutinied at Jullundur 7th of June – loyal portion joined The Loyal Purbiah Regiment
37th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry (Bengal Volunteers)1799: raised as 2nd Btn 18th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: mutinied at Benares 4 June
38th Regiment of Bengal Native Light Infantry (Bengal Volunteers)1799 raised as 1st Btn 19th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857 mutinied at Delhi 11 May
39th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry (Bengal Volunteers)1799 raised as 2nd Btn 19th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry following 1796 reorganisation when previous 19th became 2nd Btn 11th Regt
1824 2nd Battalion became 39th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry under Major H Weston
1857 mutinied at Delhi 11 May
1857 disarmed at Dera Ismail Khan and disbanded
40th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry (Volunteers)1802: raised as 2nd Btn Marine Regiment
1857: mutinied at Dinapore on 25 July. Marched to Arrah where they took part in the siege
41st Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1803: raised as 1st Btn 21st Regiment of Bengal Native Infantryh
1857: mutinied at Seetapore (Sitapur) on 4 June
42nd Regiment of Bengal Native (Light) Infantry1803: raised as the 2nd Battalion, 21st Bengal Native Infantry. 
1857: did not mutiny as a whole and were renumber in 1861 as the 5th Bengal Native (Light) Infantry
Although they did not mutiny in 1857, they eventually would (under circumstances not dissimilar to those 58 years earlier) in 1915 in Singapore.
1922: disbanded
43rd Regiment of Bengal Native (Light) Infantry1803: raised as the 1st Battalion, 22nd Bengal Native Infantry.
1857:Disarmed at Barrackpore – loyal portion formed 6th Bengal Native (Light) Infantry
1901: designated the 6th Jat Light Infantry and then later the new 1st Battalion, 9th Jat Regiment.
Post independence they were one of the regiments allocated to the Indian Army.
44th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1803: raised as 2nd Btn 22nd Regiment of Bengal Native Infantr
1857: Disarmed and dispersed at Agra and Muttra
45th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1803: raised as 1st Btn 23rd Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: mutinied at Ferozepore 13 & 14 May
46th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1803: raised as 2nd Btn 23rd Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: mutinied at Sealkote (Sialkot) 9 July. Destroyed on 12 & 16 August 1857 at Trimmoo Ghat by the Punjab Movable Column under Brigadier John Nicholson.
47th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry (Volunteers)1798: raised as the 1st Battalion, 24th Bengal Native Infantry
1857: Disarmed at Mirzapore – loyal portion formed the 7th Bengal Native Infantry
1883: the 7th (Duke of Connaught’s Own) Bengal Native Infantry the 7th (Duke of 1893:Connaught’s Own) Rajput Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1903: 7th (Duke of Connaught’s Own) Rajputs
Post independence they were one of the regiments allocated to the Indian Army.
48th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1804: raised as 2nd Btn 24th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: mutinied at Lucknow 30 May
49th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1796: intially the 25th and became the 2nd Btn 2nd Regiment
1857: disarmed at Meean Meer 13 May
50th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1804: raised as 2nd Btn 25th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: mutinied at Nagode 16 September
51st Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1804: raised as 1st Btn 26th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: mutinied at Peshawar 28 August
52nd Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1804: raised as 2nd Btn 26th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: mutinied at Jubbulpore on 1 July
53rd Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1804: raised as 1st Btn 27th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: mutinied at Cawnpore 5 June
54th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1804 raised as 2nd Btn 27th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: Mutinied at Delhi 11 May
55th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1804: raised as 1st Btn 28th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: mutinied at Mardan and Nowshera. Rebel sepoys joined the general uprisng and were eventually defeated by a British expedition.
56th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1804: raised as 2nd Btn 28th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: mutinied at Cawnpore 5 June and at Banda
57th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1804: raised as 1st Btn 29th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: Mutinied at Ferozepore 14 May
58th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1804: raised as 2nd Btn 29th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: Disarmed at Rawalpindee 7 July
59th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1798: raised as the 1st Battalion, 30th Bengal Native Infantry.
1857: Disarmed at Umritsur – loyal portion formed 8th Bengal Native Infantry
1897: designated the 8th (Rajput) Bengal Infantry,
1901: the 8th Rajput Infantry
After 1903: the 8th Rajputs
After 1918: they were designated the 4th Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment.
Post independence they were one of the regiments allocated to the Indian Army.
60th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1804; raised as 2nd Btn 30th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: Mutinied at Rohtuck
61st Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1818: raised as the Benares Levy
1857: Mutinied at Jullundur – loyal portion joined The Loyal Purbiah Regiment
62nd Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1818: raised as the Cawnpore Levy
1857: Mutinied at Mooltan
63rd Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1817: raised as the “Fatehgarh Levy”
1857: Did not mutiny – became 1st Goorkha Regiment and after India’s Independence became the 9 Gorkha Rifles and is still oneof the seven Gorkha regiments of the Indian Army.Disarmed at Berhampore – loyal portion formed 9th Bengal Native Infantry
64th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1818: raised as the Muttra Levy
1857: Disarmed at Barrah, Fort Mackeson and Peshawur 11 May
65th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry (Volunteers) 1823: raised as the 1st Battalion, 33rd Bengal Native Infantry
1857: Disarmed at Ghazeepore – loyal portion formed 10th Bengal Native Infantry
The 65th BNI was one of two Bengal Native Infantry regiments which had accepted active service in China in 1857. Accordingly, both had escaped involvement in the mutiny.
1903: designated as the 10th Jats.
66th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry and
66th (Goorkha) Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
The Original 66th:
1823: raised as 2nd Btn 33rd Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry following 1796 reorganisation when previous 33rd was absorbed by 8th Regiment
1824: 2nd Battalion became 66th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry under Major A Shadwell
1850 disbanded
Upon the annexation of the Punjab, the foreign duty allowance for troops serving there was discontinued. This caused the 66th to mutiny. The rebellion was put down and the regiment marched to Ambala where it was disbanded by Sir Charles Napier on 27 February 1850. Their colours, arms, stores etc. were handed over to the 1st Nasiri Battalion who assumed the title of the 66th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
The Goorkha Regiment:
1861 became the 1st Goorkha Regiment
1815: raised as the First Nasiri Battalion by the HEICo.
1857: designated the 66th Goorkha Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry. They did not mutiny.
1861: the Regiment gained the numerical designation of the  1st Goorkha Regiment.
 1950: 1st Gorkha Rifles (The Malaun Regiment)
They continue to serve today, as the is the seniormost Gorkha infantry regiment of the Indian Army.
67th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry (Volunteers)1823: raised as 1st Btn 34th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: Disarmed and dispersed at Agra and Muttra
68th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry (Volunteers)1823: raised as 2nd Btn 34th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantr
1857: Mutinied at Bareilly 31 May
69th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1825: raised as 1st Extra Regiment becoming 69th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: Disarmed at Mooltan, 31 August
70th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1825: raised as the 2nd Extra Battalion, Bengal Native Infantry.
1857: Disarmed at Barrackpore – loyal portion formed 11th Bengal Native Infantry
1903: designated the 11th Rajputs
1918: designated the 5th Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment.
Post independence they were one of the regiments allocated to the Indian Army.
71st Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1825: raised as 3rd Extra Regiment becoming 71st Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
Mutinied at Lucknow 30 May
72nd Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1825: raised as 4th Extra Regiment
1857: mutinied at Neemuch 3 June
73rd Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1825: raised as 5th Extra Regiment becoming 73rd Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: Mutinied at Dacca
1861: disbanded
74th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry1825: raised as 6th Extra Regiment becoming 74th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry
1857: mutinied at Delhi 11 May
Captain Cafe of the 56th BNI, after the mutiny.

The Cavalry REgiments

An Officer of the 6th Bengal Light Cavalry, 1856.
1st Bengal Light CavalryMutinied at Mhow. Disbanded in 1858, transferred to the 1st Bengal European Light Cavalry
2nd Bengal Light CavalryMutinied at Cawnpore, 4th of June
3rd Bengal Light CavalryMutined at Meerut, 10th of May
4th Bengal Light CavalryDisbanded in 1857
5th Bengal Light CavalryDisarmed at Peshawar and later disbanded
6th Bengal Light CavalryMutinied at Jallandar. In 1861, after the mutiny, the 8th Irregular Cavalry took the title and subsequently became the 6th (Prince of Wales’s) Bengal Cavalry.
7th Bengal Light CavalryMutined at Lucknow, 30th of May
8th Bengal Light CavalryMutinied at Meean Meer 15th of May
9th Bengal Light CavalryThe left wing was disarmed at Amritsar on the 10th of July and were later disbanded. The Right wing were destroyed on 12 & 16 August 1857 at Trimmoo Ghat by the Punjab Movable Column.
10th Bengal Light CavalryMutinied at Ferozepore after being disarmed.

These lists only give an outline of the magnitude of the calamity the HEICo was facing in 1857 and do not include the irregular regiments or the artillery. However, it should be clear that although this did turn into a wider uprising involving a tumultuous civilian population, 1857 started as a military revolt.

Regimental colour centre of the 41st Bengal Native Infantry found in Delhi after the mutiny.

Sources and Links:

For the maps: https://www.mtholyoke.edu/courses/rschwart/hist151/India/maps.htm
For Regimental Information: https://wiki.fibis.org/

The Indian Mutiny of 1857 – Colonel G.B. Malleson C.S.I,1891
The Memsahibs – Pat Barr, 1976
The Indian Mutiny – Saul David, 2003
The Indian Mutiny – Julian Spislbury, 2007